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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 15-2906 
____________ 
 
SONIA CRUZ-HERNANDEZ, 
 
                          Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review from an 
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Board No. BIA-1: A205-722-426) 
Immigration Judge:  Roxanne C. Hladylowycz 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 21, 2016 
 
Before:  FISHER, GREENAWAY, JR. and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: August 3, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
                                                                                                                                    
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Petitioner Sonia Cruz-Hernandez asks us to review an order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s 
decision denying her application for withholding of removal under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act and the Convention Against Torture. We hold 
that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s decision and will deny the petition 
for review. 
I 
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual 
context and legal history of the case. Therefore, we set forth only those facts that 
are necessary to our analysis. 
Cruz-Hernandez is a citizen of Honduras. In May 2014, Cruz-Hernandez 
illegally reentered the United States after having been removed from the United 
States in 2012. The Department of Homeland Security conducted a review and 
ordered that Cruz-Hernandez’s 2012 removal order be reinstated. Cruz-
Hernandez applied for withholding of removal under the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act and the Convention Against Torture. She had a withholding 
proceeding before an immigration judge, and she testified about her situation in 
Honduras as follows: 
Cruz-Hernandez had a relationship with Orbin Ramon Rodriguez-Mesa and 
together they had a son. Although Cruz-Hernandez and Rodriguez-Mesa never 
legally married, she considered herself married to him. Cruz-Hernandez’s 
relationship with Rodriguez-Mesa ended and they separated. Cruz-Hernandez 
remained close with Rodriguez-Mesa’s family and lived with Rodriguez-Mesa’s 
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father and mother, her son’s grandparents. Cruz-Hernandez worked at an Internet 
café owned by her son’s grandmother. The grandparents also owned a successful 
farm. 
In April 2013, the family began receiving threats from individuals in the 
community who demanded that Cruz-Hernandez’s son’s grandfather give them 
money and his farm. In July 2013, the family Internet café business was 
burglarized. A month later, two men came to the Internet café while Cruz-
Hernandez was working. One of the men had a gun in his waistband and told 
Cruz-Hernandez that he would kill her and her son if she said anything to the 
authorities about the theft or threats. Two other men similarly threatened her in 
September 2013. Later in September, Cruz-Hernandez’s son’s grandfather was 
shot to death while walking home at night. None of his personal belongings had 
been taken. Cruz-Hernandez believed that he was killed in retaliation for refusing 
to turn over his land and money. 
After the murder, Cruz-Hernandez’s son’s grandmother and others in the 
family continued receiving threats. Cruz-Hernandez felt that she was a prisoner 
in her own house. She came to the United States with her son in May 2014. Cruz-
Hernandez remained in contact with the family while these immigration 
proceedings were ongoing in the United States, and she reported that the threats 
against the family have continued. Her son’s grandmother still owns the 
farmland, but she had to close the Internet café. Cruz-Hernandez feels it would 
be unsafe to return anywhere in Honduras.  
The immigration judge found that Cruz-Hernandez’s testimony was 
credible. Nevertheless, the immigration judge denied her applications, finding 
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that she had not established that she was part of a particular social group, that her 
son’s grandfather was murdered due to his membership in that social group, that 
she could not safely live in another part of Honduras, that the government of 
Honduras was unwilling or unable to help her, and that she would more likely 
than not be harmed if she returned to Honduras. Cruz-Hernandez appealed this 
decision to the BIA. The BIA dismissed the appeal because the immigration 
judge’s finding that Cruz-Hernandez had not established a clear probability of 
persecution or torture was not clearly erroneous. 
Cruz-Hernandez filed a petition for review of the BIA decision. Cruz-
Hernandez argues that the BIA should not have applied the clearly erroneous 
standard to the immigration judge’s decision. Cruz-Hernandez raised numerous 
other arguments in her opening brief, but these arguments relate to issues 
considered by the immigration judge and not addressed by the BIA. Our review 
is limited to the BIA’s decision, and therefore we do not consider these 
alternative arguments.1 
II 
We have jurisdiction over this petition for review under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1). Where the BIA decides a matter on the merits, we review the 
decision of the BIA, not that of the immigration judge.2 We consider the BIA’s 
legal conclusions de novo.3 We review the BIA’s factual findings under the 
                                                                                                                                    
1.  Kaplun v. Attorney Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2010). 
2.  Id. 
3.  Mahn v. Attorney Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014). This de novo 
review is generally subject to Chevron deference, but where, as here, we are 
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substantial evidence standard and will reverse those findings only “if there is 
evidence so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could conclude as the BIA 
did.”4 
An alien is entitled to withholding of removal under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act “if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom 
would be threatened in [the country the alien is removed to] because of the 
alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.”5 The applicant bears the burden of establishing a clear 
probability that the applicant’s life or freedom would be threatened, meaning that 
it must be more likely than not that the applicant would be subject to 
persecution.6 To constitute persecution, the actor causing the harm must be the 
government or forces that the government is unwilling or unable to control.7 
The BIA dismissed Cruz-Hernandez’s appeal because it concluded that the 
immigration judge did not commit clear error in finding that Cruz-Hernandez had 
not established a clear probability of persecution in Honduras. Cruz-Hernandez 
asserts that whether she established a clear probability of persecution is a mixed 
question of law and fact that the BIA should have reviewed de novo. It is a mixed 
question of law and fact, but we nevertheless conclude that the BIA applied, if 
inarticulately, the correct standard.  
                                                                                                                                    
reviewing an unpublished decision of a single member of the BIA, Chevron 
deference does not apply. Id.  
4. Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2003). 
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). 
6. Toussaint v. Attorney Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 413 (3d Cir. 2006).  
7. Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005).  
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An immigration judge’s predictive judgment of the likelihood of harm based 
on the facts in the record is a factual finding reviewed for clear error.8 Here, the 
immigration judge found that Cruz-Hernandez’s fear of harm upon return to 
Honduras was undercut by the fact that her family members, including her son’s 
grandmother, have remained unharmed in Honduras. The BIA correctly reviewed 
this factual finding for clear error. 
Other aspects of the ultimate question of whether Cruz-Hernandez established 
a clear probability of persecution are legal issues. For example, “persecution” itself 
is a legal term of art, and whether harm rises to the level of persecution is a legal 
question that the BIA reviews de novo.9 The BIA did not need to address this legal 
question in this case. Having found that Cruz-Hernandez had not shown that she 
was likely to be harmed upon returning to Honduras, the BIA did not need to 
consider whether any harm would amount to persecution.10 
The BIA was correct to cite Kaplun for the proposition that “determinations 
as to the likelihood of future events are reviewed for clear error.”11 In this 
formulation, however, “future events” refers to specific factual occurrences such 
as imprisonment, extortion, or physical harm.12 This is distinct from the ultimate 
                                                                                                                                    
8. See Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 270 (considering the likelihood of torture). 
9. See id. at 271 (“Torture is a term of art, and whether imprisonment, beating, 
and extortion are severe enough to rise to the level of torture is a legal 
question.”).  
10. Cruz-Hernandez argued in her brief that the BIA must first review de novo 
whether or not the harm Cruz-Hernandez fears will occur upon return to 
Honduras constitutes persecution, but she offered no authority for this 
proposition and we do not find it meritorious.  
11.  (A.R. 4.)  
12.  See Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 270–71. 
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question of whether an applicant established a clear probability of persecution (or 
torture), which is a not a pure question of fact. The BIA thus misstated the 
standard of review. But because the BIA actually based its decision on a factual 
finding—the likelihood Cruz-Hernandez would be harmed if she returned to 
Honduras—we conclude that there was no reversible error. The BIA did not 
erroneously apply a clear error standard to any legal questions. 
Having concluded that the BIA applied the correct standard of review, we 
now ask whether substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that Cruz-
Hernandez had not established a clear likelihood of harm in Honduras. We 
conclude that there is substantial evidence. Although Cruz-Hernandez was 
threatened, she was never physically harmed. Her son’s grandmother has also 
received threats, but she continues to own the family’s land and she has not been 
harmed. These facts are sufficient to persuade a rational factfinder that Cruz-
Hernandez had not established a clear likelihood of harm, and the substantial 
evidence standard is accordingly met.13  
Cruz-Hernandez also appealed the BIA’s dismissal of her appeal of the 
denial of her application for withholding of removal under the Convention 
Against Torture. Her brief, however, contains no separate arguments relating to 
the Convention Against Torture. To the extent that this argument is not waived, 
we conclude that the BIA’s decision is correct for the same reasons as its decision 
under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. 
                                                                                                                                    
13. See In re A-E-M-, 21 I. & N. Dec 1157, 1160 (B.I.A. 1998) (finding that an 
applicant’s fear of persecution is undercut when his family remains in the 
country of origin unharmed).  
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III 
For the reasons set forth above, we will deny Cruz-Hernandez’s petition for 
review. 
